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Contract Law. Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Associates, Inc., 727
A.2d 174 (R.I. 1999). Subsequent homebuyers may sue the original
builder for breach of the implied warranties of habitability and
workmanlike quality that result in latent defects. The old rule,
which required contractual privity, is abandoned for its arbitrary
exclusion of recovery for innocent subsequent purchasers.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In June of 1985, Thomas and Candace Nichols (Nichols)
purchased a home on Kimberly Lane in Cranston, Rhode Island.'
The house was built in 1983 by defendant, Raymond R. Beaufort
and his construction company, R.R. Beaufort & Associates, Inc.
(Beaufort).2 The home was first sold to Beaufort's cousin, Debra
Cronin, who sold it to the Nichols about a year and a half later.3
Just after Cronin and her husband moved into the newly con-
structed house, large cracks appeared in the cement floor of the
garage. 4 To remedy the problem, which Beaufort described as
"'larger than would be acceptable' for industry standards,"
Beaufort poured a new cement floor for the garage. 5
It is unclear whether the Nichols were aware of the previous
problem with the garage floor when they bought the house, or if
they had the house inspected for defects. 6 However, three years
after the Nichols bought the house, the garage floor caved in.7 An-
other three years went by without further mishap, but in 1991,
large cracks appeared in the walls of the garage, kitchen, and also
an addition to the home that the Nichols had constructed.8
After noticing the cracks in the walls, the Nichols hired
Geisser Engineering Corporation (Geisser) to discover the root of
the problem. 9 Geisser advised the Nichols that the house had been
built on unstable soil, and that decomposition of organic materials
1. See Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Assoc., Inc., 727 A.2d 174, 175 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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in the soil was causing the walls to crack and the garage to cave
in.' 0
Thereafter, in February of 1994, the Nichols filed suit against
Beaufort, alleging negligent construction, breach of implied war-
ranties, and negligent violation of building codes." Beaufort
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Nichols were not
in privity with Beaufort, which was required for the contract based
claims, and that the statute of repose barred any tort claims.12
The superior court granted Beaufort's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that "the absence of contractual privity be-
tween the Nichols and Beaufort was fatal to the Nichols' claims."' 3
The trial justice did not address whether the statute of repose
barred the Nichols' tort claim.' 4
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Nichols argued that the statute of repose did
not bar their tort claims, and that the implied warranties owed to
the initial purchaser of a new home should extend to subsequent
home buyers in certain circumstances.' 5 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court dealt with the statute of repose issue first.
Under Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-29,16 "[n]o ac-
tion.., in tort to recover damages shall be brought.., against any
contractor or subcontractor.., more than ten (10) years after the
substantial completion of such an improvement." 17 Because
Beaufort finished constructing the house by September 26, 1983,
and the Nichols did not file their claim until February 18, 1994, the
statute of repose would bar the Nichols' claim,' However, the
Nichols argued that the house was not "substantially completed"
until Beaufort repaired the cement floor in the garage.' 9 This
work was done in late 1983, but the Nichols argued it was more
likely that the repair work was not substantially completed until
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 175.
13. Id. at 176.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 176-77.
16. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-29 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
17. Id.
18. See Nichols, 727 A.2d at 176.
19. Id.
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some time in 1984, thereby allowing their tort claim to fall within
the ten-year period prescribed by the statute of repose.20
The supreme court rejected the Nichols' argument, stating
that even if the Nichols' estimate of when the work was substan-
tially completed by Beaufort was accurate, "a litigant cannot avoid
summary judgment by merely posing factual possibilities without
submitting admissible evidence thereof."21
The supreme court then addressed whether the Nichols' im-
plied warranty claims were defeated because they lacked contrac-
tual privity with Beaufort. 22 Rhode Island law dictates that when
a builder sells a new house, the builder implicitly warrants to the
purchaser that "the construction has been or will be done in a
workmanlike manner and that the dwelling will be reasonably fit
for human habitation."23 This rule has been extended to protect
buyers who purchased a new house following a one-year rental by
the builder-vendor, since the house is still reasonably new and the
tenancy short enough in duration to justify extending the implied
warranties to the subsequent purchaser. 24
In both cases, the warranties apply because homebuyers that
rely on the professional competence of a builder should be pro-
tected from latently defective work.25 However, the supreme court
noted that the rule had not been extended to cover situations
where a relatively new home was purchased from a vendor, rather
than the builder of the home.26 Therefore, the Nichols would not
be able to recover from Beaufort even under the extended rule be-
cause they purchased the house from the original buyers, not from
the builder.
Nevertheless, the Nichols argued that if the rule did not ex-
tend to subsequent homebuyers who are admittedly not in privity
with the builder, only the first buyers will have protection from
latent defects.27 Since it is common for houses to have several
owners, contractors will have no incentive to maintain high stan-
20. See id. at 177.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id. (quoting Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 298 A.2d 529, 531 (R.I.
1973)).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. (citing Sousa v. Albino, 388 A.2d 804, 805-06 (R.I. 1978)).
27. See id. at 179.
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dards.28 The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed. The court enu-
merated eleven reasons in support of its holding that subsequent
purchasers do not need to be in privity with the builder in order to
sue the builder for breach of an implied warranty against latent
defects. 29
The court reasoned that the privity requirement should be
abandoned because: (1) it defeats the purpose of the warranty,
leaving subsequent purchasers without a remedy, (2) the warranty
is intended to protect all innocent buyers, (3) transfer of ownership
should not defeat the warranty, (4) defects typically appear over
time, raising the probability that initial buyers will not discover
latent defects, (5) it is foreseeable that there will be subsequent
purchasers, (6) subsequent purchasers have little ability to inspect
the construction, (7) builders are under a legal duty to construct
habitable homes in a workmanlike manner, (8) limiting recovery to
first purchasers could encourage builders to enter sham sales as a
means of insulating themselves from liability, (9) builders are bet-
ter able to insure themselves against mistakes than innocent pur-
chasers, (10) the privity requirement has been abandoned for other
contractual relationships, and (11) the tort statute of repose is in-
applicable in a warranty case. 30
However, the supreme court also made clear that the new rule
is not without limitations.31 Subsequent home owners may only
bring warranty claims against the home builder where the defects
are latent, not discoverable at the time of purchase and appearing
only after the subsequent buyers' purchase.32 In addition, suit
may only be brought within three years of the time when the de-
fects were discovered or should have been discovered. 33 Finally,
the court made clear that the burden is on the plaintiffs to show
that the builder's breach of warranty caused the latent defect.34
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 179-81.
31. See id. at 181.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 182.
34. See id.
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CONCLUSION
In Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Associates, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court made an important statement that will serve to
protect consumers. Persons who do not purchase homes from the
original builder may still hold the builder liable for breach of the
implied warranties of habitability and workmanlike quality that
result in latent defects to the house. The privity requirement is
dropped in the interest of providing increased protection to home
buyers and providing incentives for homebuilders to maintain
quality workmanship.
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